Subject-Object Relation in Mullâ Sadrâ’s Theory of Knowledge :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Subject-Object Relation in Mullà ¢ Sadrà ¢Ã¢â‚¬â„¢s Theory of Knowledge ABSTRACT: Dividing knowledge to knowledge by presence and knowledge by representation, Mullà ¢ Sadrà ¢ treats the subject-object relation with regard to each one of them differently. In the former, the subject is united with the object, or rather they are one, and the reality of knowledge is this very unity. In this type of knowledge, there is no medium. Such unity culminates, on the one hand, in knowledge by presence comprehensively and completely conveying the objective reality, and in its untransferability on the other. By contrast, in knowledge by representation, the subject experiences another kind of relation to the object of knowledge thanks to the presence of a medium in the subject’s mind, called "mental form." Mullà ¢ Sadrà ¢ considers mental forms as the mental existence of the same quiddities (mà ¢hà ®yyà ¢t) existing in the external world. The only difference is that they have another type of existence. In this essay, I argue that this approach is congruent with the principality of quiddity, which is rejected by Mullà ¢ Sadrà ¢. To be consistent with the basic pillar of Mullà ¢ Sadrà ¢Ã¢â‚¬â„¢s philosophy, viz., the principle of existence, I hold that one should begin with the continuity of existence through mental, imagery and external worlds from which the mind abstracts the same quiddity, not vice versa. The problem of the interaction between subject and object in the process of cognition is a crucial issue in a theory of knowledge. Cognition, a unique window on the objective world, has captured the attention and motivated research and debate by scholars in a wide variety of fields over millennia. In all discussions regarding the phenomenon of knowledge, one question has always been raised no matter what the approach, method or focus of inquiry employed. For Kant, the distinction between nomenon and phenomenon and the determination of categories were major concerns. For the psychology of sensation and perception, the search continues for scientific methods to settle the extent to which an individual vis à   vis the environment effects the content, as well as the form, of sensory perception. In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, discussion revolves around the relation between ‘à ¢lim and ma‘là »m (knower and known). The question, expressed more precisely is: How much of what we know can be credited to objective reality per se, and how much is the creation, influence, or interference, of our mental power? It might also be asked how much and in what ways this influence alters the reality of the object of our cognitive system.